Will The Navy's Zumwalt Stealth Destroyer Ever Be Fixed?

The Navy is functioning on networking sensors between its submarines, surface warships,
helicopters, patrol planes and attack jets through “Cooperative Engagement” technology.

In January 2019, the Navy will commission its second hi-tech Zumwalt-class stealth destroyer,
the USS Michael Monsoor. The third and last, USS Lyndon B. Johnson was launched this
December 2018 and can be commissioned in 2022.

Traditionally, warships are tailored to perform specific missions. But the cutting-edge Zumwalt
has been a ship in search of a mission, especially since procurement of hyper-expensive
ammunition for its primary weapon was canceled. Years and billions of dollars later, the
Navy may finally have found one.

within the post-Cold War 1990s, the U.S Navy lacked peer competitors on the high seas, so it
conceived its next-generation surface combatants for engaging coastal targets. because the Navy
phased out its last battleship, it decided its next destroyer should mount long-range guns that
could to supply more cost-efficient naval gunfire support than launching million-dollar
Tomahawk cruise missiles.

within the 2000s, development proceeded for a DDG-1000 destroyer integrating every
next-generation technology then conceivable. The Navy promised Congress a bigger destroyer
requiring only 95 crew rather than 300 because of automation, with adequate space and
power-generation capacity to deploy railguns and laser weapons. The new warships would be
stealthier to avoid enemy attacks and pack rapid-firing 6-inch guns with a variety of 115 miles for
the sustained bombardment of land targets. Thirty-two DDG-1000s were to succeed the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer.

The lead ship USS Zumwalt took shape sporting a futuristic-looking tumblehome hull—wider
below the waterline than above—helping reduce the 190-meter long vessel’s radar cross-section
thereto of alittle fishing smack . The ship’s induction motors generated a whopping 58 megawatts
of electricity while cruising, enough to power the whole 17,630-ton ship because of an Integrated
power grid . The electrically-driven motors and chilled exhaust also reduce the destroyer’s
infrared and acoustic signature. The vessel’s new Total Ship Computing Environment networked
all the destroyer’s systems, making them accessible from any console throughout the vessel.

additionally to rapid-firing 6” guns, the Zumwalt had eighty Mark 57 missile vertical-launch cells
dispersed across her bow and stern to attenuate secondary explosions. These could target and
launch Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles, ASROC anti-submarine rockets, or quad-packs of
Evolved Sea Sparrow medium-range air-defense missiles. The Zumwalt’s spacious landing pad
and hangar could accommodate up to 3 MQ-8B helicopter drones or two MH-60R
helicopters, which may carry Hellfire anti-tank missiles or torpedoes. The destroyers also boast a
capable dual-bandwidth sonar for hunting submarines, but lack the torpedo armament found in
Arleigh Burkes.

The destroyer’s crew of one-hundred-and-fifty—plus a twenty-eight-person air

detachment—exceeded by over 50 percent the originally promised number, but remained half
that of an Arleigh-Burke destroyer. However, some analysts fear the super-trim crew
complement leaves insufficient redundancy should the vessels sustain combat casualty .

Indeed, by 2008, the Navy was not highly concerned with bombarding militarily weaker
countries. Rather, it contemplated the challenge posed by China’s rapidly expanding surface and
submarine fleets, and therefore the proliferation of deadly anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles.

Worse, the Zumwalt’s Advanced Gun System didn’t even work that well, with two-thirds the
forecast range (around 70 miles). Furthermore, its rocket-boosted LRLAP GPS-guided shells cost
$800,000 dollars each—nearly as expensive as more precise, longer-range and harder-hitting
cruise missiles. The Navy finally canceled the insanely expensive munitions, leaving the Zumwalt
with two huge guns it can’t fire.

Downsizing and Downgrades:

Despite the well-known difficulties of developing next-generation military systems, the Zumwalt
had been sold to Congress supported unrealistic minimum-cost estimates. Eventually, program
costs exceeded the budget by 50 percent, triggering an automatic cancelation consistent with the
Nunn—McCurdy Act.

Already by 2008, the Navy sought to ditch building quite two Zumwalts in favor of
procuring Arleigh Burke Flight III destroyers with ballistic-missile defense capabilities. Maine
Senator Susan Collins nonetheless wrangled a 3rd destroyer to stay her state’s Bath Iron Works
shipyard in business.

Each Zumwalt now costs $4.5 billion—in addition to the $10 billion spent on development. Like
the troubled F-35 and Littoral warship , the Zumwalt’s spiraling costs were thanks to the Navy’s
ambition to integrate completely new technologies still being concurrently developed. the ultimate
design wasn't even stabilized by the time construction began in 2009. The hybrid electrical
system has proven especially challenging to integrate, leading the Zumwalt to interrupt down while
crossing the Panama Canal in November 2016.

Nearly decade after she was laid down, a 2018 Government Accountability Office report stated
only five of the Zumwalt’s twelve key technologies was “mature.” Farcically, the ships were even
officially “delivered” without combat systems. The lead ship, commissioned in 2012, won’t be
ready for operational deployment until 2021.

the necessity to curb runaway costs led to crippling downgrades. rather than fitting combining a
powerful SPY-4 volume search radar with a SPY-3 hi-resolution targeting radar, the Navy ditched
the previous and rejigged the SPY-3 to handle volume-search also . This saved $80 million per
ship but significantly degraded air-search capabilities.

However, the Zumwalt currently only has Evolved Sea Sparrow defense missiles with a variety
of thirty miles—adequate just for local coverage at the best . Though the Zumwalt’s missile cells are

compatible with longer-range Standard Missiles, those depend upon the Aegis Combat System for
guidance, which the Zumwalt lacks. and therefore the Zumwalt’s last-ditch Close-In Weapon Systems were
downgraded from 57-millimeter to much less capable 30-millimeter cannons.

Even the destroyer’s radar cross-section has been degraded to chop costs, with the adoption of
cheaper steel for the deckhouse and therefore the incorporation of non-flush sensor and communication
masts.

Ship-Hunting Stealth Destroyers?:

What were merely three DDG-1000s good for, despite their nifty stealth features and propulsion?
The advanced destroyers lacked ammunition for his or her guns, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine
torpedoes, and long-range area-air defense missiles. Furthermore, the Zumwalt had fewer cells
to pack land-attack missiles than Arleigh-Burke destroyers (96), Ticonderoga-class cruisers (122),
or Ohio-class cruise-missile submarines (144)—all of which were cheaper, and therefore the last of which
is stealthier.

Even the destroyer’s stealthy hull didn't offer a transparent advantage if it had to escort—or required
an escort from—un-stealthy warships. And keeping a category of just three vessels operational
meant very high overheads expenses in training and sustainment per individual ship. Thus, many
analysts speculate the Zumwalt’s operational career could prove short-lived.

The Zumwalt needed a replacement mission—even if that meant tweaking its capabilities at an
additional cost. Finally, in December 2017 the Navy announced the category would concentrate on
“surface strike”, i.e. hunting down other ships.

The destroyers are going to be modified to fireside new Maritime Tomahawk Block IV subsonic anti-ship
missiles and SM-6 active-radar-homing missile. The latter can provide longer-range defense
missile (up to 150 miles) and features a secondary ground or naval attack capability. Compared to the
Tomahawk, the SM-6 features a much smaller 140-pound warhead, but its maximum speed of Mach
3.5 makes it much harder to intercept. Eventually, cheaper ammunition could also be developed for
the presently-useless guns, or they'll be swapped out for extra missile launch cells or
even future railguns or directed-energy weapons.

This surface warfare role may best leverage the Zumwalt’s stealth capabilities, allowing it to
range before the fleet and penetrate “anti-access” zones threatened by long-range anti-ship
missiles. It could creep closer to enemy warships before launching its own missiles, giving
adversaries little time to react.

The Navy is additionally performing on networking sensors between its submarines, surface warships, helicopters, patrol planes and attack jets through “Cooperative Engagement” technology. Thus one strategy could see distant “spotter” generating targeting data using active radar, then
transmitting it to a sensor-ghosting Zumwalt to perform the strike.

the value of the present upgrades is reportedly $90 million—a sum which can prove worthwhile

if it helps recoup some value after the $22 billion sunk into the ambitious but failed ship concept.

Sébastien Roblin holds a master’s degree in conflict resolution from Georgetown University and
served as a university instructor for the Peace Corps in China. He has also worked in education,
editing, and refugee resettlement in France and therefore the us . He currently writes on
security and military history for War Is Boring.